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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 970411-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's instruction to the jury that their 
decision was not difficult—that it involved only one issue on 
one charge—and that there verdict had to be either "guilty" or 
"not guilty" constituted a coercive use of an Allen charge? 
Appellate review of an Allen charge is not barred where counsel 
was not forewarned of the instruction and had no opportunity to 
know of, or object to, it until after it was given to the jury. 
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1988). 
In reviewing the trial court's Allen charge, this Court must 
consider whether the language of the supplemental charge can 
properly be said to be coercive per se, or whether it is coercive 
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under the specific circumstances of the case." Lactod, 761 P.2d 
at 30, 31. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which addresses jury instructions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Steven D. Clements appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment imposed by the Honorable John C. Backlund after a jury 
trial where he was convicted of Driving under the Influence of 
Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, and Open Container, a class C 
misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Clements was charged by information with Driving under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 41-6-44, and Open Container, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-
44.20 on or about July 15, 1996 (R. 2-3). 
On May 28, 1997, a jury trial was held in this matter in the 
Orem Department, Fourth District Court, the Honorable John C. 
Backlund presiding (R. 113-14, 141) . After the jury had 
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deliberated for approximately two hours, they were "invited" back 
in the courtroom and the following dialogue took place: 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now.... Both 
counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited 
the six members of the jury to come into the court. Members 
of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar 
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict 
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday, 
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while 
you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you 
need to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think 
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can 
unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL; Some of us think we should go back in for 
two minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will 
have you brought back out in five minutes, then. If you 
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can't, then we will have to figure out something else to do. 
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this 
evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one 
real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or 
"no". You have to make up your minds, folks. So we'll have 
you brought out again in five minutes, then 
(Tr. transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39). 
After this dialogue the jury deliberated for another five 
minutes and returned with a verdict of "guilty" on both counts 
(Tr. at 139-40). Clements was sentenced to one year in the Utah 
State Prison consecutive to the sentence he was serving in 
another case and a $2500.00 fine (R. 117, Tr. at 143). On June 
27, 1997, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court and 
this action followed (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 31, 1996, at approximately midnight, Harold "Skip" 
Curtis, a deputy with the Utah County Sheriff's Department was 
dispatched to the Maple Bench Campground in Payson Canyon on a 
report of intoxicated individuals in the campground (Tr. at 41). 
When Curtis arrived he was directed by the campground host to a 
Ford Explorer that was parked in camp No 4 (Tr. at 42). It was 
reported to Curtis that the driver of the vehicle, Steven 
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Clements, had been disturbing other campers before returning to 
his vehicle (Id.). 
Curtis approached the Explorer and found Clements and a 
female passenger "either passed out or sleeping" (Tr. at 43). 
Curtis then knocked on the door but received no response (Id.). 
Curtis then opened the door, called in, and Clements sat back and 
began to yell (Id.). Curtis testified that after Clements calmed 
down, he requested identification, which Clements took out of his 
wallet with a bit of trouble (Tr. at 43-44). Curtis also 
testified that he could smell a strong odor of alcohol in the 
vehicle; and that the radio was on and the keys were in the 
ignition (Tr. at 44). Curtis then called for backup because of 
Clements1 "loud boisterous manner" and "threats of physical 
violence" (Id.). 
While waiting for backup, Curtis blocked the Explorer's path 
with his patrol car (Tr. at 46). When Officer Morgan arrived, 
Clements, who was again laid back in the seat either asleep or 
passed out, was told to exit the vehicle (Id.). Curtis testified 
that Clements again became verbally aggressive (Tr. at 47). 
Clements stumbled exiting the vehicle and could not stand up 
without holding on to the vehicle (Id.). 
Curtis then placed Clements under arrest for driving under 
the influence of alcohol (Id.). Curtis testified that an 
intoxilyzer test was done and the result was .157 (Tr. at 48). 
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Curtis searched Clements' vehicle and found a open bottle of gin 
on the floor of the passenger's side (Tr. at 49). Curtis 
testified that Clements admitted to having two beers and that 
"they were going to sleep it off for a few minutes and then he 
was going to drive them home" (Tr. at 49-50). 
Curtis also testified that no one had witnessed Clements 
driving the Explorer (Tr. at 52); and that the motor was not 
running when he approached the vehicle (Tr. at 53). Curtis 
testified further that after Clements had been arrested and he 
returned to deal with the passenger the keys to the vehicle were 
found in the passenger's waistband at some point by Officer 
Morgan; and that the passenger was still asleep and appeared to 
be in the same position (Tr. at 55, 56). In addition, Curtis 
testified that both Clements and the passenger believed they were 
in a canyon near Vernal (Tr. at 45, 58). 
Officer Mike Morgan, a sergeant employed by the Utah County 
Sheriff's Department, testified that he assisted Curtis at the 
Maple Bench Campground (Tr. at 64-65). Morgan and Curtis 
approached the vehicle, eventually roused Clements, identified 
themselves, and asked Clements to exit the vehicle (Tr. at 66-
67). Clements was so intoxicated he thought the sleeping bag he 
and the sleeping passenger were sharing was a coat (Tr. at 67). 
Morgan testified that after Clements was arrested, Curtis 
informed him that the vehicle's keys were in the ignition (Tr. at 
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69). However, when Morgan returned to the car to deal with the 
passenger, there were no keys in the ignition (Id.). Morgan then 
got the passenger out of the car and he testified that she told 
him that the keys were not in the car and that Clements had 
driven them there (Tr. at 72-74) . The passenger also told Morgan 
that she and Clements had planned on camping at the campground 
(Tr. at 86). Morgan later found the keys in the waistband of the 
passenger's waistband (Tr. at 76). Morgan also testified that 
the passenger admitted to lying about the keys so Clements 
wouldn't be arrested for DUI (Tr. at 77). The Explorer belonged 
to the passenger (Tr. at 84) . 
Wayne Crook, a friend of Clements, testified that late in 
the afternoon on May 31, 1996, Clements and the passenger came to 
his house up Payson Canyon and that the three of them went into 
the canyon to drink (Tr. at 90-91). Clements and the passenger 
went up to the Grotto area of Payson canyon first and then were 
joined by Crook, his son and a border who had stopped first at 
the liquor store in Payson (Tr. at 92, 94). Crook testifed that 
Clements and the passenger had been drinking very little before 
going up the canyon (Tr. at 93). Crook testified that he 
believed that the passenger drove the Explorer when they left his 
house (Tr. at 93) . Crook testified that the group—except 
Crook's son—drank both at the Grotto and at Look-out Point (Tr. 
at 101-02). 
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After leaving the Grotto, Clements rode with Crook, and 
Crook's son drove the passenger in the Explorer up to look-out 
point and then down to the campground (Tr. at 94-96). 
Crook testified that Clements and the passenger planned to 
camp in Payson canyon and had borrowed a sleeping bag from him 
(Tr. at 96). Approximately 10-15 minutes after arriving at the 
campground, Crook took possession of the Explorer's keys from his 
son and told Clements that he would bring the keys up in the 
morning (Tr. at 97) . Crook did this because Clements "was 
getting pretty wild there, and [the passenger] was causing a lot 
of arguments and she was totally gone" (Tr. at 106). Crook 
testified that after his conversation with Clements, he gave the 
keys to the passenger because she demanded them and because it 
was her vehicle (Tr. at 98, 107-08) . During the conversation 
with the passenger Clements was in the Explorer 15-25 feet away 
talking with the border (Tr. at 99). Crook, his son, and the 
border then left the campground. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A supplemental verdict-urging instruction to a deliberating 
jury that has been unable to reach an unanimous verdict is not 
prohibited provided the instruction is not coercive per se or 
coercive under the specific circumstances of the case. In this 
case, the trial court's instruction is both coercive per se and 
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coercive under the context and circumstances of the case. One, 
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the jury that they were required to reach a verdict of either 
"guilry" or "noL guilt.y". Two, the instruction was coercive when 
viewed in the context of the trial because of the significant 
colloquy between the judge and jury, because the judge threatened 
to make the jury return next week if they could not immediately 
reach a verdict, and because The jury, in fact, rendered a 
verdict of "guilty" on both counts almost immediately after the 
instruction was given. Accordingly, Clements asks rhis Conn: to 
reverse his convictions because of the "manifest injustice" 
caused by The trial court's erroneously coercive supplemental 
instruction to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT 
THEIR DECISION WAS NOT DIFFICULT, 
THAT IT INVOLVED ONLY ONE ISSUE ON ONE COUNT, 
AND THAT THEIR VERDICT MUST BE EITHER "GUILTY" OR "NOT GUILTY" 
IS AN IMPERMISSIBLY COERCIVE ALLEN INSTRUCTION 
Clements was charged with two separate offenses: Open 
Container and Driving under The Influence of Alcohol; and born 
charges were submitted to a jury for a decision. After the jury 
had been deliberating for approximately TWO hours on The charges, 
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they were "invited" into the courtroom and the following dialogue 
ensued: 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now.... Both 
counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited 
the six members of the jury to come into the court. Members 
of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar 
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict 
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday, 
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while 
you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you 
need to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think 
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can 
unanimously agree on a Verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in for 
two minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will 
have you brought back out in five minutes, then. If you 
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can't, then we will have to figure out something else to do. 
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this 
evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one 
real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or 
"no". You have to make up your minds, folks. So we'll have 
you brought out again in five minutes, then 
(Tr. transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39). After this dialogue the jury 
deliberated very briefly and returned with a verdict of "guilty" 
on both counts (Tr. at 139-40). 
Clements asserts that the trial court's dialogue with the 
jury is a "verdict urging" instruction akin to an "Allen charge" 
which takes its name from the case of Allen v. United States, 164 
U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). In Allen, the 
United States Supreme Court approved of a supplemental 
instruction to a jury having difficulty in reaching an unanimous 
verdict. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
Although Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that appellate review can only be sought for erroneous 
instructions if an objection was made at trial, Rule 19 also 
grants this Court the power to assign error to instructions "in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice". U.R.Cr.P. Rule 19(c). 
Specifically this Court has previously held that appellate review 
would not be barred where counsel had no forewarning of the 
issuance of a verdict-urging instruction, and "had no opportunity 
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to know of or object to the allegedly harmful portion of the 
instruction until after it was given to the jury." State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1988). 
This case falls squarely within the Lactod exception for 
appellate review. The trial court invited the jury into the 
courtroom and engaged in the aforementioned dialogue without any 
warning to counsel or any opportunity for input or objection from 
counsel. Accordingly, this Court should review the propriety of 
the trial court's verdict-urging instruction to the jury in this 
case. 
Over the years, many courts—including this Court—have 
expressed concern that an Allen-type supplemental instruction 
could be potentially coercive—depending on its contents and 
context. See, State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992); 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 30-31 (Utah App. 1988). In reviewing the 
propriety of the trial court's Allen instruction this Court must 
consider whether the language of the supplemental charge can 
properly be said to be coercive per se, and if not, then whether 
it is coercive under the specific circumstances of this case. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30, 31. 
A. The language of the trial court's instruction was coercive 
per se and requires reversal by this Court. 
In Lactod, this Court for the first time was called upon to 
decide the identical issue at stake here. This Court decided 
that the trial court's instruction was not coercive per se 
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because the instruction in Lactod "did not tell the jury that it 
was required to reach a decision." 761 P.2d at 31. Such an 
admonition constitutes a per se coercive instruction which must 
be reversed.1 As this Court noted in Lactod, it is "a 
misstatement of law that a criminal case must be decided at some 
time." 761 P.2d at 31 (citations omitted). 
The relevant part of the trial court's instruction in Lactod 
consisted of: "I want to encourage you as best you can to reach 
some kind of agreement.... If you don't reach an agreement and 
the jury hangs up and cannot come to any kind of agreement we get 
to send you folks home and reschedule this whole thing and start 
over again.... We would very much like to get a settlement out of 
this matter if we can. 761 P.2d at 28. 
On the other hand, the trial court in this case explicitly 
told the jury that they had to reach either a "guilty" or "not 
guilty" verdict: "This is not a complicated case. There's only 
one real issue here on the one count, and it's either 'yes' or 
'no.' You have to make up your minds, folks" (Tr. at 138-39). 
Accordingly, because the jury was told they had to reach a 
decision, the language used by the trial court in instructing the 
jury was coercive per se and requires reversal by this Court. 
lSee Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 
1059, 1060 (1965) (per curiam). 
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B. The trial court's instruction was also coercive under "the 
specific circumstances of the case." 
After determining that the instruction in Lactod was not 
coercive per se, this Court considered whether the instruction 
"under the specific circumstances of the case" was coercive. 761 
P.2d at 31. Relevant factors in assessing the "coercive effect 
include 'any colloquy between the judge and the jury foreman, 
[and] circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction.... 
'" Id. 
In Lactod^ this Court ultimately decided that the Allen 
instruction at issue was not coercive because "we think the jury 
understood that the judge was not intending to force a verdict 
one way or the other, but, rather, was merely encouraging the 
jurors to reach an agreement, if possible." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 
32. However, the context and circumstances surrounding the Allen 
instruction given to the jury in Lactod is distinctly different 
from the specific circumstances surrounding the trial court's 
instruction in this case. 
One, in Lactod "there were no significant colloquies between 
the judge and the jury foreman." 761 P.2d at 31. In this case 
their was a running dialogue between the jury foreman and the 
trial court. In fact, when the jury was told that if they could 
not reach a verdict that evening then they would have to come 
back next week, the foreman stated "Some of us think we should go 
back in for two minutes" (Tr. at 138). To which the trial court 
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replied: "All right. Let's do that, then. We will have you 
brought back out in five minutes, then. If you can't, then we 
will have to figure out something else to do" (Id.). 
Two, in Lactod the jury deliberated for another hour and 
fifteen minutes after receiving the instruction. 761 P.2d at 31. 
In this case, however, it can be inferred from the colloquy 
between the judge and jury that the jury returned a verdict of 
"guilty" on both counts almost immediately after receiving the 
instruction (Tr. at 137-40) . 
Three, in Lactod "the judge did not threaten to or keep the 
jury deliberating for an unreasonable length of time." 7 61 P.2d 
at 31. Specifically the trial court told the jury that if they 
could not reach an agreement then "I'm not going to let you go 
too much longer." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 28. To the contrary, 
Judge Backlund told the jury that they would have to come back in 
a week to finish their deliberation if they could not reach an 
agreement: "Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has bee 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my proposal 
that we recess at this time. Fife have this calendar every 
Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict this 
evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday. . . then 
you can take as long as you need to arrive at a verdict11 (Tr. at 
138)(emphasis added). It was this dialogue which caused the jury 
to ask for "two" more minutes of deliberation (Id.). 
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Four, in Lactod the trial court told the jury to "Be open 
minded, understanding. Be compromising as best you can without 
surrendering your honest and true feelings, because we don't want 
you to go in there and let everybody walk all over you." 761 
P.2d at 28. In this case, Judge Backlund gave the jury no such 
reminder that "the verdict must be the verdict of each 
individual, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his 
fellows " Lactod, 761 P.2d at 32 n.2 (quoting Allen, 17 S.Ct. 
at 157). In fact, in addition to compelling a verdict from the 
jury in this case, Judge Backlund also inappropriately commented 
on the strength of the evidence in this case by emphatically 
admonishing the jury that "This is not a complicated case. 
There's only one real issue here on the one count, and it's 
either 'yes' or fnof" (Tr. at 138-39). Although Clements was 
being charged with two separate crimes which each contained 
numerous elements, Judge Backlund usurped the role of the jury as 
fact-finder by telling them that only one element of one count 
was at issue. 
Because of the significant colloquy between the judge and 
the jury, because the jury's verdict came almost immediately 
after the instruction, because the judge threatened to make the 
jury come back next week if they could not reach a decision, and 
because the trial court inappropriately commented on the 
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evidence, this Court should find that the instruction taken as a 
whole and in context with the trial itself was coercive. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Clements asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Open Container because 
the trial court's Allen instruction to the jury was both coercive 
per se and coercive under the specif circumstances of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O day of December, 1997. 
^ A ^ ^ Q « Vv^l 
Margarey P. Lindsay J<^ 
Counsel for Steven D. Clements 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief to Laura Cabanilla, Deputy Utah 
County Attorney, 100 E. Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606 
this <? day of December, 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
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989 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 19 
Rule 19* Instructions, 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reason-
bly directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the 
^y on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
Lquests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such in-
structions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
ghall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of submitting. 
Elements of offense. 
Failure to request or object. 
—Review without objection. 
Objections. 
—Failure to object. 
—Specificity. 
—Time. 
Presumptions. 
Requests by jury. 
Specific instructions. 
—Circumstantial evidence. 
—Elements of offense. 
—Lesser included offenses. 
—Unreliability of eyewitness identification. 
—Verdict-urging instruction. 
Untimely request. 
Cited. 
Effect of submitting. 
When an instruction is submitted by a party, 
that same party cannot later object to it; he has 
already waived any objection and endorsed it 
as legally sound. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
When a party submits more than one in-
struction on a single issue, it is reasonable to 
assume that one instruction represents that 
party's preferred position, while the others rep-
resent backup positions. Therefore, the party 
cannot complain when the court uses only one 
of the requested instructions. State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Elements of offense. 
An information instruction is not a substi-
tute for an elements instruction. The jury must 
be instructed with respect to all the legal ele-
ments that it must find to convict of the crime 
charged, and the absence of such an instruction 
is reversible error as a matter of law. Failure 
to give the instruction can never be harmless 
error. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 
1991). 
Even though defendant failed to object to the 
lack of an elements instruction when the in-
structions were given, trial court's complete 
failure to give an elements instruction was 
clear error and required reversal of his convic-
tion and remand for a new trial. State v. Jones, 
823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991). 
Failure to request or object 
Where a defendant does not request an in-
struction on a certain subject, he cannot later 
claim that the trial court's failure to instruct 
on that subject is error. State v. Cowan, 26 
Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). 
Except when necessary to avoid manifest in-
justice, this rule prohibits the assigning as 
error the trial court's failure to give a jury in-
struction where no objection is made before the 
jury is instructed. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds, 
721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
Where oral admissions of defendant in a 
criminal trial are introduced without an in-
struction that such evidence ought to be 
viewed with caution, there is no error as long 
as such an instruction has not been specifically 
requested, especially in a case where the sub-
ject matter is generally covered by the instruc-
tions that are given. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1984). 
When faced with a claim that a particular 
assertion of instructional error not raised at 
trial should be considered on appeal because 
failure to do so would result in "manifest injus-
tice" under Subdivision (c), the Supreme Court 
will determine whether to review such a claim 
of the witnesses who have testified, it's the State's 
position that you will return a verdict to convict the 
defendant of both charges. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Court would like to thank 
both counsel for their presentation of the case to the 
jury. If I can have Ms. Stevensen stand, please, I will 
administer the oath to her to take charge of the jury. 
Ms. Stevensen, do you solemnly swear that you 
will take charge of this jury and take them to some 
private and convenient place where they may deliberate 
upon their verdict, allowing no one to speak to them, nor 
to do so yourself, unless so ordered by the Court, and to 
return them into court when they have so reached such a 
verdict or when so ordered, so help you God? 
COURT CLERK: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will be in 
recess, then, as the jury deliberates. So members of the 
jury, if you'll go with Ms. Stevensen, she'll take you to 
the jury room. 
(Recess taken while jury deliberates) 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now in the 
matter of State versus Steven Clements. Both counsel 
are present, as is Mr. Clements. We have invited the six 
members of the jury to come into the court. Members of 
the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict? And 
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who is your foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
THE COURT: Okay, then. Mr. Hall, you are the 
foreperson, and has the jury been able to arrive at a 
verdict on each count, sir? 
THE COURT: Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has 
been deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this 
calendar every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach 
a verdict this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock 
next Wednesday, and that I handle other cases and other 
calendar while you're in the jury room. Then you can take 
as long as you need to to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you 
think that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this 
time, you can tell me that also. If you just don't think 
you can unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in 
for two minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We 
will have you brought back out in five minutes, then. 
If you can't, then we will have to figure out something 
else to do. I would sincerely hope that you can reach a 
verdict this evening. This is not a complicated case. 
There's only one real issue here on the one count, and 
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it's either "yes" or "no./1 You have to make up your 
minds, folks. So we'll have you brought out again in 
five minutes, then. 
(Recess taken while jury further deliberates) 
THE COURT: We're on the record now in the matter 
of State versus Steven D. Clements, and he is present with 
Counsel. The prosecutor is present, and the jury members 
are present, seated in the jury box. Mr. Hall is acting 
as jury foreperson. 
Mr. Hall, has the jury been able to arrive at a 
verdict on each count? 
MR. HALL: Yes, we have. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Stevensen, would you 
go to the jury box, please, and retrieve the verdict forms 
from Mr. Hall. Then I will read those into the*record. 
Thank you. 
Before I read the verdict into the record, 
let me thank the jury. I think you've been extremely 
conscientious and you've spent a great deal of time, 
obviously, analyzing the evidence. In behalf of the 
parties of this case we thank you for your time today. 
Again, we apologize to you for the late starting time. 
I will read the verdicts, then, in the order 
that I've been given them. "We, the jury, find the 
defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of the offense of 
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open container." The second reads, "We, the jury, find 
the defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol." 
The Court will discharge the jury at this time. 
You are free to go, folks, and thank you so much. So 
we'll excuse you at this time with our thanks for service 
well done. The easiest way I think would be just to go 
right out through this door out the front, wouldn't it, 
Carla? You will not be called during the rest of this 
jury term, since you now have served on a jury that has 
rendered a verdict. So thank you so much. 
(Jury exits the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Mr. Clements, the law provides that 
you return for sentencing after 2 days and within 45 days, 
or you may waive that time and be sentenced now. Do you 
prefer to come back for sentencing -- if you'd like to 
confer with your attorney and make that decision — or 
would you rather be sentenced today? 
(Counsel conferring with defendant off the record) 
MR. GALE: We would waive the sentencing time 
period, Judge, and just ask for the Court to grant 
sentence today. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, it's obvious that 
Mr. Clements has at least two prior DUI's within the six 
years. So are you aware of anything else I should know 
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